Skip Ribbon Commands Skip to main content
Agricultural Economics
:

profile


Profile Image

Steven Yu-Ping Wu

Agricultural Economics 

  • Associate Professor of Ag Economics
765.494.4299
Krannert Room 784B

Dr. Wu has been an associate professor at The Ohio State University. His research and teaching interests are in the areas of Applied Contract Theory and Incentive Systems, Applied Microeconomics, Experimental Economics, Regulation and Public Policy related to Agricultural Contracting. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of California Berkeley in Agricultural and Resource Economics in December 2001.

Much of his work centers around contract theory and applied contracting issues in agriculture. His current interests are in contract regulation and contract legislation in agriculture; the empirical testing of incentive systems; and the design of optimal pricing and incentive schemes for marketing, production, and supply contracting.

He is also interested in the study of informal incentives used by individuals and organizations to manage performance and regulate economic activity. Wu is a faculty affiliate in the John Glenn School of Public Affairs at Ohio State, a Research Fellow with the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Germany, and a member of the Economic Design Network in the Department of Economics at the University of Melbourne.

Research and Publications

Awards & Honors

(2008) Research Fellow. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

(2008) Research Fellow. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Selected Publications

Wu, S. (2014). Adapting Contract Theory to Fit Contract Farming. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 96, 1241-1256.

Yoder, J., Alexander, C., Ivanic, R., Rosch, S., Tyner, W., & Wu, S. (in press). Risk vs Reward, a Financial Analysis of Alternative Contract Specifications for the Miscanthus Lignocellulosic Supply Chain. BioEnergy Research.

Alexander, C., Ivanic, R., Rosch, S., Tyner, W., Wu, S., & Yoder, J. (2012). Contract Theory and Implications for Perennial Energy Crop Contracting. Energy Economics, 34(4), 970-979. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988311001186

Alexander, C., Ivanic, R., Rosch, S., Tyner, W., & Yoder, J. (in press). Contract Theory and Implications for Perennial Energy Crop Contracting. Energy Economics.

Contract Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions. (2010). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92, 28-41.

Brady, M. (in press). The Aggregation of Preferences in Groups: Identity, Responsibility, and Polarization. Journal of Economic Psychology.

Contract Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions. (in press). American Journal of Agricultural Economics.

Just, D. (2009). Experimental Economics and the Economics of Contracts. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(5), 1382-1388. Retrieved from http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118482046/home

Lee, M., & Fan, M. (2008). Balancing Grower Protection against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 33(2), 154-168.



Moves the World Forward